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GOVERNING IN A RIGHTS 
CULTURE 
Mary Dawson, Q.C.
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper will address the impact on governments
1
 of the 
entrenchment of rights in our Constitution and will also touch upon 
some of the claims that are made as to their broader impact on society as 
a whole. The positive observations are explored as well as some of the 
concerns. An attempt is made to assess critically some of the concerns 
that have been expressed within government circles. 
The extent to which these criticisms and claims reflect reality, 
however, is beyond the scope of the paper. That assessment should be 
made, at least in relation to policy decisions taken by government, but 
that will require focused discussions in specific cases with those who 
are directly involved in those policy decisions. 
This paper, hopefully, is a first step in that direction. It will draw no 
specific conclusions and will make no recommendations. Rather it will 
focus on identifying concerns so that we can address them head on. 
Once we have identified them, and agreed that these are our concerns, 
we will be able to deal with them. We can lay aside those that are myths 
and move beyond those we can do nothing about. We should then be in 
a position to deal with the rest.  
________________________________________________________________ 
* Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Justice, Ottawa. This 
paper is reproduced with permission of the CBA from conference 
materials published in The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: 
Twenty Years Later in 2001. The views expressed in the paper should 
not be taken as necessarily reflecting the position of the Government of 
Canada on any matter. 
1
 Often in this paper, when governments are referred to, the 
reference is to government in the broad sense, including the legislatures. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The patriation of Canada’s Constitution, on April 17, 1982, was in 
itself a watershed event, completing at last the final legal step in 
Canada’s slow march to independent nationhood. Canada now had its 
own amending formula. But that was not all that Canada acquired on 
that rainy spring day. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
2
 
was given pride of place as Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982.
3
 
Immediately following the Charter is Part II, Rights of the Aboriginal 
Peoples of Canada, with its recognition and affirmation of the 
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. These 
first two parts of our patriation package have had a profound impact on 
Canadian society. 
The Charter is a reflection of the classical liberal vision championed by 
Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, with its spotlight on the importance 
of the individual and individual rights.
4
 The Charter was also conceived 
as a unifying force for Canadians, establishing a common set of 
constitutionally protected rights that apply to each and every Canadian. 
Much debate took place as the Charter was constructed, concerning both 
its detail and the desirability of entrenching a Charter at all. Once the 
Charter became part of our Constitution, however, much of the 
nervousness and concern melted away, at least amongst the general 
public. Perhaps one of the most remarkable observations about the 
Charter is the extent to which it has become a symbol of pride and a 
source of identification for Canadians, thus becoming a unifying force 
as had been hoped. 
Aboriginal and treaty rights, unlike most of the rights in the Charter, 
are collective, group rights that belong not to individual Aboriginal 
persons but to the Aboriginal group to which they belong.
5
 Section 35 of 
________________________________________________________________ 
2
 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (hereinafter “the Charter”). 
3
  Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
4
 It is interesting to note, though, that some of the rights protected 
by the Charter relating to linguistic issues have, to a greater or lesser 
extent, a group aspect to them. See sections 16 to 23 (official 
languages), section 16.1 (linguistic communities in New Brunswick), 
and section 23 (minority language educational rights). Consider, as well, 
the underlying protection for minority groups that is afforded by section 
15. 
5
 This is not to say that Aboriginal or treaty rights are not often 
invoked at the individual level. See, for example, R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 
1 S.C.R. 1075. 
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the Constitution Act, 1982,
6
 recognizes the separate status of particular 
groups on the basis of their historical circumstances. Charter rights pertain 
to our status as individuals and are concerned with the relationship between 
the state and the individual. Thus the basis for these two types of rights is 
quite different. Aboriginal peoples can claim their rights against 
governments or against other Canadian citizens. The Charter, on the other 
hand, is directed against governments alone. Charter rights and section 35 
rights are not at all comparable, but are treated together in this paper 
because both types of rights form part of the “rights culture” in which 
we now find ourselves. 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is clothed in simple terms. 
Subsection 35(1), the core of the section, could almost be taken as a 
tautological statement: “The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” 
Despite its apparent simplicity, the courts have given it great force. The 
last two decades have seen enormous strides in the identification and 
acceptance of Aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada. 
As exciting and popular as the entrenchment of Parts I and II in the 
Constitution Act, 1982 have been, there are those who claim that the 
entrenchment was not a good idea, or at best that it was a mixed 
blessing. 
The Charter has had an enormous impact on governments. Some 
Charter critics would claim that far too much power has been shifted 
from the legislatures and governments to the courts. Others, while not 
necessarily critics of the Charter itself, have expressed broader concerns 
relating to power and control. They point to the added impediments to 
governmental action and decision-making that come with the need to 
take those new rights into account. Some worry that the legislatures and 
governments are actually being prevented from achieving important 
________________________________________________________________ 
6
 Section 35 reads as follows: 
 35.(1) The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and 
affirmed. 
 (2) In this Act, “Aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes 
the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada. 
 (3) For greater certainty in subsection (1) “treaty rights” 
includes rights that now exist by way of land claims 
agreements or may be so acquired. 
 (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the 
Aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are 
guaranteed equally to male and female persons. 
254 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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goals or are being diverted by rights activists from social and economic 
reforms that are more important than the issues of the day brought by 
pressure groups. More generally, some claim that the rights culture is 
having an effect that goes to the root of our social structure and is 
damaging the very cohesion of our society. 
Canada was not alone in entrenching rights in its Constitution. Our 
closest neighbour, the United States of America, has had its Bill of 
Rights for more than two centuries.
7
 The United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, a major influence on Canada’s Charter, 
was adopted and proclaimed on December 10, 1948, following closely 
on the end of the Second World War.
8
 In the years that followed, the 
United Nations expanded the scope of its human rights protections in a 
number of instruments.
9
 Under the auspices of the Council of Europe, 
formed in 1949 for the protection of human rights, pluralist democracy 
and the rule of law, The European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
10
 was adopted on November 
4, 1950 and came into force on September 3, 1953. In turn, individual 
states are establishing their own special laws. 
Within Canada, itself, the move towards the Charter was a gradual 
one. In 1960, the Canadian Bill of Rights
11
 was enacted by Parliament, 
but it was a simple statute and, with few exceptions,
12
 was not given 
pre-eminent force. During the period leading up to the entrenchment of 
the Charter, human rights codes were developing in Canada at both the 
federal and provincial levels.
13
 
________________________________________________________________ 
7
 The American Bill of Rights came into force on December 15, 
1791. 
8
  G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). 
9
 Among the most important are the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 3.  
10
  The protection of these rights was reaffirmed very recently with 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was 
signed and proclaimed on December 7, 2000. 
11
 S.C. 1960, c. 44; R.S.C. 1985, App. III. 
12
 For one of the few instances where the Bill of Rights was given 
teeth, see R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282. 
13
 Saskatchewan’s legislation was the first, in 1947 (Saskatchewan 
Bill of Rights, 1947, S.S. 1947, c. 35). The Canadian Human Rights Act 
was enacted in 1978 (S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, now R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6). For 
further details, see Tarnopolsky, Discrimination and the Law, 2nd ed., 
revised by Pentney (Don Mills, Ontario: De Boo, 1985), Chapters 1 and 
2. 
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Canada was one of the first, if not the first, country with a strong 
tradition of parliamentary supremacy to entrench rights in its 
Constitution. This was an easier leap for Canada than for Great Britain, 
for instance, because Canada already had a written constitution. A 
written constitution for Canada was made necessary by the fact that it 
was a federation with a division of legislative powers that had to be 
established in detail by statute. Canadian governments have become used 
to having their legislation scrutinized by the courts to ensure that they are 
not overstepping their legislative authorities. However, the entrenchment 
of individual and group rights in our Constitution has brought a whole 
new dimension to the relationship between the legislatures and the 
courts. Constitutionally protected rights bring us into the domain of 
values and public policy far more deeply and starkly than do the more 
technical legal issues relating to the division of powers. 
Rights are not new to the legal system. Private law, regulating the 
relationship between individual citizens, has always been a matter of 
weighing the rights of one claimant against another, a matter of winners 
and losers. This is the proper domain of the courts, not of governments. 
Furthermore, from time to time, in private law cases the courts have 
been seen to take sudden leaps, to break from precedents, and, in effect, 
to create or invent new law. One need only look at one of the first torts 
cases studied in law school, Donoghue v. Stevenson,
14
 for an example of 
this judicial creativity. Donaghue was a 1932 case in Scotland about a 
snail in a ginger beer bottle. In that case, the Privy Council (Lord Atkin) 
for the first time in a Commonwealth court extended the causal link in a 
negligence suit to find that a manufacturer owed a duty of care, not only 
to direct purchasers, but to potential clients further down the chain of 
connection. 
There are also examples of such leaps in cases where a government is 
a party. Again turning to jurisprudence cited in first year law school, we 
find a constitutional law case, Edwards v. Attorney-General for 
Canada,
15
 perhaps better known in recent years as the “persons case.” 
That was the case where women sought the right to be eligible to sit in 
the Senate, to be considered “qualified persons” under section 24 of the 
then British North America Act, 1867.
16
 In that case, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council overturned a long line of cases from 
several different countries that confirmed the ineligibility of women to 
________________________________________________________________ 
14
 [1932] A.C. 562. 
15
 [1930] A.C. 124. 
16
  30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
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take public office. Not only did it break from a clear line of 
jurisprudence in the common law world, but it also created a new way to 
interpret Canada’s Constitution. It was strongly argued by governments 
that the British North America Act had to be interpreted and understood 
as it would have been in 1867, when written. Lord Sankey, in the Privy 
Council, found differently, stating that the Constitution “planted in 
Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural 
limits.”17 He established the “living tree doctrine” which has had an 
important effect on the interpretation of our Constitution, allowing it to 
grow and develop in order to fit current circumstances. 
Even within this context, the constitutional changes made in 1982 were 
profound. The courts have taken up their expanded domains with 
enthusiasm and vigour.
18
 The changes have themselves unleashed a 
dynamic of their own and have changed the way Canadians understand 
themselves as individuals. Global events take us, and much of the rest of the 
world, in the same direction. In recent years many countries, and many 
international groupings of countries, have developed standards of human 
rights, as we have done in Canada. We have entered a rights age, a rights 
culture. This culture reinforces itself, and the pursuit of one’s rights, 
whether as between citizens and their governments or more broadly as 
among private citizens, becomes accepted and, some would argue, 
expected. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING MECHANISMS 
The search for balance and compromise, so much a Canadian trait (or 
at least one to which we aspire), is reflected in the Charter and in the 
way that our courts deal with the protection of Aboriginal and treaty 
rights under section 35. 
Both sections 1 and 33, forming figurative and literal brackets around 
the rest of the Charter, offer some relief from the potential rigour of its 
guarantees. 
Canada, so far as we know, was the first country to include in its 
fundamental law on rights a provision contemplating the limitation of 
________________________________________________________________ 
17
 Supra, note 15, at 136. 
18
 Without the Charter and section 35, one could surmise that the 
courts might have gradually moved in the same general direction as that in 
which these constitutionally entrenched rights have taken us, but not with 
the same specificity or within the same time frame. 
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those rights.
19
 Section 1
20
 sets out the general guarantee of the rights and 
freedoms in the Charter, and then allows for the rights and freedoms to 
be superseded by public interest considerations if their limitation can be 
“demonstrably justified.” This provision, notably placed at the 
beginning of the Charter, carries with it the message that rights and 
freedoms cannot be seen as absolutes. Rights and freedoms can be 
limited by law so long as the limits are justified in accordance with 
section 1. 
There are several sections of the Charter that carry within themselves 
balancing mechanisms that limit the scope of rights even before resort is 
to be made to section 1. For example, section 8 refers to “unreasonable 
search and seizure” (emphasis added) and section 9 refers to “the right 
not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned” (emphasis added). In those 
cases, most of the balancing takes place with the rights section itself. 
Other sections, like sections 7
21
 and 15
22
 of the Charter, include 
concepts that are particularly susceptible to value judgments. Section 7 
refers to “principles of fundamental justice,” while section 15 addresses 
equality rights. Courts have exercised a good portion of their balancing 
within these sections, rather than waiting for a section 1 analysis. One 
________________________________________________________________ 
19
 Other countries are showing interest in this approach. South 
Africa’s Constitution has followed the Canadian precedent and Israel 
has considered doing so as well.  
20
 Section 1 of the Charter reads as follows: 
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only 
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
21
 Section 7 reads as follows: 
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
22
  Section 15 reads as follows:  
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law 
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or 
activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of 
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
258 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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significant effect of this shift, at least in principle, is on the burden of 
proof. The burden of proof lies on government under section 1, but on 
the rights claimant under the rights and freedoms sections of the 
Charter. 
Recent Supreme Court decisions have evidenced a tendency to import 
into sections 7 and 15 almost all of the balancing that can take place in 
relation to them. This trend is being called the “contextual approach.” 
Much has been written recently on the move away from section 1.
23
 This 
subject is a large one and well beyond the scope of this paper. 
Section 33
24
 is another unique Canadian provision. It allows for a 
five-year suspension of certain of the Charter protections if Parliament 
or a legislature finds it appropriate to invoke the section. The Quebec 
National Assembly established a blanket application of section 33 for 
unique political reasons
25
 soon after the patriation of the Constitution in 
________________________________________________________________ 
23
 See, for a good overview of recent trends under section 15, 
Hogg’s discussion of discrimination: Hogg, Constitutional Law of 
Canada, looseleaf, 4th ed., vol. 2, (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) (updated 
1999, release 1), section 52.7(b). 
24
 Section 33 reads as follows: 
33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may 
expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the 
legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision 
thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included 
in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a 
declaration made under this section is in effect shall have 
such operation as it would have but for the provision of this 
Charter referred to in the declaration. 
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease 
to have effect five years after it comes into force or on such 
earlier date as may be specified in the declaration. 
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-
enact a declaration made under subsection (1). 
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made 
under subsection (4). 
25
 Soon after the Charter was adopted, the Quebec National 
Assembly passed an omnibus law, An Act respecting the Constitution 
Act, 1982, S.Q. 1982, c. 21, invoking the section 33 override in relation 
to all Quebec laws as well as adopting the override routinely in each 
new Act. This practice lapsed as a routine matter when a Liberal 
government was elected in Quebec at the end of 1985. 
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1982 but, with that exception, section 33 has not often been used.
26
 This 
is perhaps as it should be since section 33 is a blunt instrument and 
carries with it no justificatory text or other balancing mechanism. On the 
other hand, it does have a five-year limit. There are those who argue that 
section 33 has been underutilized.
27
 The Supreme Court itself has given 
it a tentative legitimacy, contemplating the possibility of “even 
overarching laws under section 33 of the Charter.”28 Whether desirable 
or not, section 33 does provide elected representatives with a way to 
escape the framework of the Charter in exceptional circumstances. 
In a parallel way, the jurisprudence on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, relating to Aboriginal and treaty rights, has recognized that these 
rights must be understood and made operational in the context of a 
diverse society that is integrated with the Aboriginal peoples who hold 
those rights. Accordingly, the courts recognize that governments still 
have the power to regulate the exercise of Aboriginal rights if those 
governments are pursuing a valid legislative objective, but they must 
________________________________________________________________ 
26
 Saskatchewan invoked section 33 in the S.G.E.U. Dispute 
Settlement Act, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. 111 (back to work legislation) for 
fear that it offended paragraph 2(d) of the Charter (freedom of 
association). The use of the override was later proven unnecessary by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 460, where the majority held that the right to strike was not 
protected by paragraph 2(b). In addition to the early general application 
of the override in Quebec, the Quebec National Assembly invoked 
section 33 several times, even after the Liberal government was elected 
in 1985. Its use became very controversial in one instance: in relation to 
the French-only sign law in An Act to amend the Charter of the French 
Language, S.Q. 1983, c. 56. That declaration expired after five years 
and was not renewed. Alberta used the override very recently in the 
Marriage Amendment Act (S.A. 2000, c. 3, amending The Marriage Act, 
R.S.A. 1980, c. M-6), which came into force on March 23, 2000 (to 
prevent marriage between same-sex couples). The Government of 
Alberta also considered using it recently in legislation aimed at capping 
liability relating to involuntary sterilizations, but withdrew that initiative 
in light of public reaction. The Parliament of Canada has never invoked 
section 33. 
27
 See, for example, Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: 
Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (Don Mills, 
Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 38, and Hogg, Constitutional 
Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), at 914-17. 
28
 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at 566, per Iacobucci 
and Cory JJ. (emphasis added). 
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still honour their responsibilities towards the Aboriginal peoples before 
any other user group.
29
 
The Supreme Court consistently stresses the need to negotiate a 
solution when the interests of others clash with the rights and interests 
of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.
30
 The Court recognizes that the 
parties themselves can come up with much better solutions than the 
Court can if those parties will negotiate in good faith to find those 
solutions. Such matters belong, to a great extent, in the political realm 
where it is much easier to avoid a win-lose solution that may not lend 
itself to long-term accommodation. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
1. Charter Rights 
The Charter has created a new relationship between federal, provincial 
and territorial governments in Canada and their citizens.
31
 It has established 
a direct right for any Canadian to take governments in Canada to court in 
relation to the infringement of any of the rights guaranteed by the 
Charter, whether by actions of a government or by statute. Governments 
in Canada have always been answerable for failure to adhere to general 
principles of natural justice or for failure to meet human rights standards 
they have set in their own legislation, but the Charter has opened up a 
multitude of new grounds of complaint. Section 15, the equality section, 
is particularly fruitful in this regard. It makes governmental programs 
and social policy decisions vulnerable to reassessment by the courts on 
grounds of discrimination. The remedies for a successful challenge 
have, on occasion, resulted in adjustments to government programs that 
have expanded them beyond their original scope and have sometimes 
resulted in significant additional expenditures. When large sums of 
money are at stake, alarm bells go off amongst politicians, public 
servants, and the general public alike. 
________________________________________________________________ 
29
 See R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; and R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 456 (hereinafter cited as R. v. Marshall (No. 1)). 
30
 See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 29, at 1123, 
and R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at 817-18. 
31
 In fact, many of the provisions of the Charter actually extend 
beyond Canadian citizens to include all individuals in Canada. 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) Governing in a Rights Culture 261 
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An important early Charter decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
was the Singh
32
 case in 1985. It had wide policy and financial 
implications. One of the primary purposes of the Charter was to protect 
the weak from the strong, the individual from the power of the state. 
The Singh case addressed itself to one of the most vulnerable groups in 
society. It related to procedural protection for refugee claimants. The 
Supreme Court found that all individuals present in Canada, not only 
citizens or residents, will benefit from the protection of section 7 of the 
Charter on the bases of the principles of fundamental justice referred to 
in that section. It went on to find that oral hearings were necessary in 
certain circumstances to determine the credibility of refugee claimants. 
This resulted in fundamental changes to our refugee determination 
scheme that involved costs in the billions of dollars. It also resulted in 
changes in procedures of many other decision-making bodies. 
The Schachter case,
33
 like the Singh case,
34
 had an important impact 
on public money. That case, based on section 15, started on its way 
through the courts in 1986
35
 and came to its ultimate resolution in the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1992. Mr. Schachter was a natural father 
complaining that his rights had been violated because adoptive fathers 
had access to benefits that were not available to natural fathers. The 
Federal Court-Trial Division extended the benefits to natural parents 
and this was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal.
36
 The Supreme 
Court modified the decision, limiting the cases where, and setting rules 
for determining when, the courts can actually adjust legislation, thereby 
changing the result in the Schachter case. However, by that time a 
relatively small program ($5 million) had been converted to one costing 
hundreds of millions. Furthermore, the original trial level decision led to 
an entirely new parental benefits scheme that adjusted the way benefits 
were paid to all parents, and resulted in a new theory of maternity and 
parental leave. 
On the other hand, in the recent Lovelace case,
37
 the Supreme Court 
declined to extend to non-status Indians and Métis communities rights 
________________________________________________________________ 
32
 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 
1 S.C.R. 177. 
33
 Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679. 
34
  Supra, note 32. 
35
  Schacter v. Canada, [1988] 3 F.C. 515 (C.A.). 
36
  Schacter v. Canada, [1990] 2 F.C. 129 (T.D.). 
37
 Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950. In that case, the Court 
found that the casino project was specifically targeted at improving the 
circumstances of a status Indian community in a way that corresponded 
to their actual needs and circumstances and that the exclusion of the 
262 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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assigned to members of bands registered under the Indian Act. That case 
involved the distribution of funds generated by a casino on an Indian 
reserve. 
Some Charter cases, often in the area of criminal law, can result in 
costs that are not measurable in monetary terms but can have a 
significant societal impact. The Askov decision
38
 is, perhaps, the best 
known example of such a case. There, the Supreme Court found that 
criminal cases were simply taking too long in the courts and rendered a 
decision that resulted in large numbers of cases being dropped. That 
decision resulted, as well, in significant new provincial expenditures for 
the administration of justice, particularly in Ontario. In the Stinchcombe 
case,
39
 additional burdens were put on the Crown relating to disclosure 
of evidence to the accused. Such a decision has significant costs to 
society, some of them hidden. While full disclosure carries with it the 
possibility of shorter trials and reduces the chance of injustice towards 
the accused, the Stinchcombe case resulted in the need for additional 
resources to comply with the new requirements and generated a 
significant volume of litigation to determine how far disclosure should 
go, particularly when the information relates to third parties. 
At the same time, courts are by no means oblivious to cost 
considerations. In the Schachter case
40
 the Supreme Court found that, 
while cost implications cannot be used to justify a particular decision, 
they can be considered in determining the appropriate remedy. Two 
years later, in the Prosper case,
41
 the Supreme Court declined to impose 
certain obligations on government to make legal aid available, observing 
that such a finding would result in serious cost implications for the 
provinces. In that case the Court found that:  
 
… it would be a very big step for this Court to interpret the Charter 
in a manner which imposes a positive constitutional obligation on 
governments. The fact that such an obligation would almost certainly 
interfere with governments’ allocation of limited resources by 
requiring them to expend public funds on the provision of a service is, I 
might add, a further consideration which weighs against this 
interpretation.
42
 (Emphasis in original) 
                                                                                                                                
other groups did not undermine the purpose of the program since it was 
not based on a misconception of the needs of the other groups.  
38
 R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199. 
39
 R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. 
40
 Supra, note 33, at 709. 
41
  R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236. 
42
 Id., at 267. 
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Sometimes court decisions have minimal cost implications, but may 
in effect cut off policy options for governments. The Burns and Rafay 
case
43
 contained strong language that one could argue might even cut off 
the possibility of Canada reintroducing the death penalty, should 
Parliament some day determine that it would be appropriate to do so.
44
 
Yet, in another controversial area, the Supreme Court struck down the 
abortion provisions of the Criminal Code
45
 in the Morgentaler case,
46
 
but left room for Parliament to re-enact its legislation on abortion while 
at the same time meeting the requirements of the Charter, as established 
by the Court. The Government of Canada attempted new legislation 
following the decision but, when it met some resistance in the Senate, 
chose to let the situation stand. It has not taken up the subject of 
abortion again, leaving the field unregulated. 
2. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 
As for Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982, relating to Aboriginal and 
treaty rights, section 35 raised to the constitutional level the status of the 
Aboriginal and treaty rights that were in existence on April 17, 1982. 
Unlike the Charter, section 35 does not address itself directly to 
governments and legislatures. Nor does it direct itself to remedies in 
case of a breach of the rights it recognizes. Nor does it include express 
balancing mechanisms such as those described in the previous section of 
this paper. Because section 35 is a recognition and affirmation of rights, 
it follows that these rights can be raised in any context and can be 
argued in disputes against private litigants as well as against 
governments. 
In the decade before section 35 came into force, the courts were 
increasingly defining and relying on Aboriginal rights in their decisions 
and establishing the extent of government responsibilities towards the 
________________________________________________________________ 
43
  United States of America v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. 
44
 Id., at para. 77, the Court found that “while government policy 
at any particular moment may or may not be consistent with principles 
of fundamental justice, the fact that successive governments and 
Parliaments over a period of almost 40 years have refused to inflict the 
death penalty reflects, we believe, a fundamental Canadian principle 
about the appropriate limits of the criminal justice system.” 
45
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 251. 
46
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
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Aboriginal peoples of Canada.
47
 No one was quite sure, when section 35 
was enacted, just what effect entrenchment would have on these rights. 
There have been many important Aboriginal cases in the years 
following the enactment of section 35 that have ensured that the rights 
affirmed in that section have been given full force. Twenty years later 
we find that litigation on Aboriginal and treaty rights has grown 
exponentially. 
The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of section 35 for the first 
time in the Sparrow case,
48
 a 1990 decision. It confirmed that the 
“existing” rights were those that were not extinguished prior to 1982. It 
also found that those rights were not absolute but that any laws that 
infringed them would have to meet a high standard of justification (not 
at all dissimilar to the “reasonable limits” test we find in section 1 of the 
Charter). Finally, and of great significance to governments, the Supreme 
Court found in the Sparrow decision that the Government of Canada
49
 
had a “fiduciary” relationship with the Aboriginal peoples of Canada at 
the constitutional level.
50
 This means that the government must keep the 
best interests of the Aboriginal peoples at heart when dealing with their 
interests. In the words of the Court, “the special trust relationship and 
the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis Aboriginals must be the 
first consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in 
question can be justified.”51 
________________________________________________________________ 
47
 See Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), [1973] 
S.C.R. 313, recognizing that the Nishga people of British Columbia 
possessed Aboriginal rights to their lands that had survived European 
settlement; Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development), [1980] 1 F.C. 518 (T.D.), relating to 
mining laws impairing Aboriginal rights in the Baker Lake Area, 
particularly the right to hunt caribou.; Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 
described infra, note 50. 
48
 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
49
 This would apply as well to other governments. See, for 
example, R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, at 185-87 and Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia, supra, note 29, at 1107. 
50
 Another important decision that dealt with a fiduciary 
relationship of the Government of Canada was Guerin v. R., supra, note 
47. That case dealt with Indian properties and the Government’s role in 
dealing with these properties as a fiduciary. This is a more usual use of 
the trust or fiduciary concept. It likely served as an inspiration to the 
Supreme Court in developing the concept in relation to section 35. 
51
 R. v. Sparrow, supra, note 48, at 1114, per Lamer C.J.C. and La 
Forest J. on behalf of a unanimous court. 
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The finding of this special relationship between the Government of 
Canada and the Aboriginal peoples of Canada confirms a unique link 
between the Government and Aboriginal peoples that was not evident 
from section 35. It puts a particular overlay on how the government is to 
address Aboriginal issues. Hence, there is a special responsibility on 
governments that goes beyond the relationship that governments would 
have with other groups as well as beyond the relationship that a private 
individual would have with Aboriginal peoples. While there is no direct 
application provision linking the rights to governments, as there is in 
subsection 32(1) of the Charter,
52
 Aboriginal and treaty rights remain a 
particular responsibility of governments that differs from, and augments, 
in relation to Aboriginal peoples, the relationship that governments have 
more generally with all Canadian citizens. 
A recent case of great significance to the Government of Canada is 
the Marshall case,
53
 dealing with treaty rights of the Micmac Indians to 
fish on the east coast of Canada. In that case the Supreme Court gave a 
broad, and many would say unexpected, interpretation to a treaty 
entered into in 1760-61 and found that the Aboriginal peoples involved 
must be allowed access to a moderate livelihood from fishing in that 
area.
54
 It also found that the constitutional rights of those Aboriginal 
peoples must be balanced against the non-constitutionalized rights of 
others engaged in the fishery, citing a previous decision where it stated 
“it has frequently been said that rights do not exist in a vacuum, and that 
the rights of one individual or group are necessarily limited by the rights 
of another.”55 The Government of Canada is currently involved in 
negotiations to give practical effect to the Marshall decisions and, in 
doing so, must find a way to balance the rights and interests of the 
________________________________________________________________ 
52
 Subsection 32(1) reads as follows: 
32. (1) This Charter applies 
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect 
of all matters within the authority of Parliament 
including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and 
Northwest Territories; and  
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in 
respect of all matters within the authority of the 
legislature of each province. 
53
  R. v. Marshall No. 1, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456. 
54
 Id., at 470. 
55
 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 (hereinafter cited as R. v. 
Marshall No. 2, at 552-53, referring to R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013, 
at paras. 91-92. 
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Aboriginal peoples and the interests of the non-native fishers who also 
depend on that fishery for their livelihood. 
V. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
There is no doubt that the entrenchment of the Charter and of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights in the Constitution of Canada in 1982 has 
limited the power of the legislatures and governments and has increased 
the power of the courts, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, since 
the courts are called upon to determine the scope of those rights. 
Governments must make sure that their actions and their laws respect 
the constitutionally-entrenched rights and the courts must, when those 
actions or laws are challenged, determine whether governments have 
succeeded in respecting the rights. Power has flowed from the elected 
representatives to an appointed judiciary. These are clear facts. 
What is not so clear is whether this has been a good thing. 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court is in high repute. It scores high in 
public opinion polls and enjoys an excellent international reputation. A 
Supreme Court decision on rights generally paves the way for 
Parliament or the other legislature involved to proceed with legislative 
or policy initiatives that respond to that decision with much less 
opposition than it would have had in the absence of such a decision. 
Politicians consistently score low on popularity polls, with lawyers 
among the few who would score lower. Generally, Canadians appear 
quite comfortable having the courts, certainly the Supreme Court, rule 
on the legality of governmental actions. Judges are seen as more 
dispassionate and fairer than politicians and as more inclined to support 
minority rights. Much of the academic literature on the subject would 
suggest the same comfort level with the courts.
56
 Furthermore, some 
argue that the perceived legitimacy of the Supreme Court has been 
enhanced by the very fact that rights have been entrenched.
57
 
Despite the relatively high comfort level with the courts, there 
certainly are criticisms of the judicial role in rights determination. Some 
________________________________________________________________ 
56
 See Devlin, “The Charter and the Anglophone Legal Theory” 
(1997), 4(1) Review of Constitutional Studies, at 36-37, for a summary 
of opinion on both sides of this discussion. 
57
 Ignatieff, Challenges for the Future (Supreme Court of Canada 
125th Anniversary Conference, Ottawa, September 2000), at 1-2; 
Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of 
Liberal Constitutionalism (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 
2001), at 27-28. 
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argue that it is undemocratic to allow an unelected institution to make 
what are fundamentally policy decisions. Allan Hutchinson rather 
caustically remarks in a recent work:  
 
My proposal to abandon rights-talk and give democratic dialogue a 
real chance will only ring hollow and naïve to those latter-day 
aristocrats who crave the privilege to decide what is best for 
others.”58 
 
There is likely a significant correlation between those who criticize the 
judicial role and those who oppose the Charter itself or are, at best, luke-
warm to it. 
In a related vein, some argue that courts should not be making these 
decisions because judges constitute a remote group who do not reflect, 
represent or even understand the general public. Joel Bakan examines 
what he calls the “trust” arguments for relying on judges and concludes 
that there is no basis to defer to their value judgments because judges 
have their own biases from which they cannot escape.
59
 He claims that 
judges are fundamentally a conservative group, chosen from among an 
elite stratum of society, and that they take their approaches from what 
he calls “dominant ideologies.”60 He agrees with a number of other 
critics that the courts favour big business interests, which they see as 
meritorious because they contribute to the wealth of society. Even 
letting corporations in under the shelter of some of the Charter 
protections is cited as evidence of this bias.
61
 Many, including Bakan 
and Hutchinson, point to the lack of success that unions have had in 
pressing some of their claims before the courts as evidence of this same 
tendency.
62
 
Section 15 of the Charter is particularly laden with value judgments. 
Questions can be raised about some of the section 15 decisions that extend 
________________________________________________________________ 
58
 Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf:  A Critique of Law and Rights 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), at xiii. 
59
 Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), Chapter 2. 
60
 Id., Chapter 7. 
61
 See, as well, Hutchinson, supra, note 58, at 32-34 and 150-51. 
62
 Examples of these cases are: R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin 
Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573; the “Labour Trilogy”: Reference re 
Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; 
P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 460. 
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benefits to groups not covered by the legislation that establishes the benefits 
scheme. The Supreme Court has stated that: 
 
Since Andrews, it has been recognized in the jurisprudence of this 
Court that an important, though not exclusive, purpose of s. 15(1) is 
the protection of individuals and groups who are vulnerable, 
disadvantaged, or members of “discrete and insular minorities”. The 
effects of a law as they relate to this purpose should always be a 
central consideration in the contextual s. 15(1) analysis.
63
 (Emphasis 
added.)  
 
Of particular interest in the Court’s statement is that the element of 
disadvantage is not essential to the application of section 15. A number 
of section 15 decisions, in fact, do result in extending coverage to 
groups that would not usually be considered to be disadvantaged. One 
example is the Schachter case,
64
 referred to earlier, where 
unemployment insurance benefits relating to childcare were extended to 
natural fathers. This is evidently an area where the thinking of the Court 
has evolved since the earlier cases and appears to be continuing to 
evolve. 
Of significance in this connection is a very recent speech to a legal 
audience by the Chief Justice of Canada. In that speech,
65
 she recognized 
that “Supreme Court of Canada decisions repeatedly assert that reversing 
the harmful effects of stereotypical discrimination is the central purpose 
of section 15.”66 However, she went on to say: 
 
… rectifying the situation of disadvantaged groups is arguably not 
the only type of equality that falls within section 15 of the Charter. 
The Charter positively accords Canadians equal benefit of the law 
and equal protection from the law’s burden. This can be argued to 
extend the guarantee of equality to matters beyond the scope of 
traditional anti-discrimination law, to the equal provision of state 
benefits, even where the group excluded is not the object of historic 
discrimination. The primary concern in such cases is not whether 
________________________________________________________________ 
63
 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at 537, citing Andrews v. Law Society of British 
Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
64
 Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.  
65
 Chief Justice McLachlin, “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” 
(2000 Constitutional Cases, Professional Development Program, 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 6 April 2001) (published in 
this law review). 
66
 See McLachlin, id., at p. 25 of this book. 
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the group to which the plaintiff belongs has suffered historical 
disadvantage requiring a legal remedy, but whether the State’s 
largesse has been appropriately distributed.
67
 
 
The Chief Justice then concluded her assessment of the issue by posing 
the very questions that governments continue to grapple with: 
 
Where the goal is equal distribution of benefits, the rules seem less 
clear than where the goal is amelioration of the downtrodden class’s 
situation. Must the claimant be a member of a disadvantaged group? 
Could the government, for example, cut all men out of a welfare 
scheme on the ground they are not disadvantaged, leaving section 
15(2) aside for the moment? What serves as a sufficient or 
substantial distinction between one disadvantaged group and 
another? Where, within groups, can the legislature permissibly draw 
cut-off lines? What about the argument that it is for the legislature 
to decide how to allocate limited resources?  Canadian courts have 
wrestled with these issues in Schachter and, again, in Law. In Law, 
the Court upheld Parliament’s power to cut off benefits on the basis 
of age, reasoning that the distinction did not deny the complainant’s 
human dignity. However, issues remain, and the Canadian attempt 
to fit benefit schemes into section 15 doctrine will continue to 
develop.
68
 
 
None of this leaves governments with a great deal of guidance. It can 
afford some comfort, however, in the fact that both the courts and 
governments are asking the same kinds of questions. 
Intuitively, one might assume that the charge that courts are elitist 
might add some weight to the argument that too much power has flowed 
from Parliament to the courts. The problem with this, however, is that 
many see Parliament as being controlled by elites as well. Much has 
been heard in recent years about the dissatisfaction of back-benchers as 
to their level of input into public policy decisions. Their frustration is 
understandable. But it is not only elected members of Parliament or of 
other legislative assemblies who are seeking greater input into decisions. 
The public at large would also like to be heard. These are ongoing issues 
that continue to require attention. 
Perhaps the most potent argument against the legitimacy of the courts 
determining rights in the social policy context is that they are simply not 
equipped to make decisions on social policy issues. Judges are trained in the 
________________________________________________________________ 
67
 Id., at pp. 25-26 of this book. 
68
 Id., at p. 26 of this book (footnotes omitted). 
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law, not in social policy, and do not have access to the tools necessary to 
balance competing social interests.
69
 Furthermore, the adversarial nature of 
the litigation process does not lend itself to the trade-offs and compromises 
that make the political process workable. 
The Supreme Court itself has recognized the strength of this argument 
and has expressed, on a number of occasions, the need to defer to the 
legislatures when policy choices that do not go to fundamental values 
must be made. In the Libman case, the Court stated: 
 
This Court has already pointed out on a number of occasions that in 
the social, economic and political spheres, where the legislature 
must reconcile competing interests in choosing one policy among 
several that might be acceptable, the courts must accord great 
deference to the legislature’s choice because it is in the best position 
to make such a choice.
70
 
 
Even more recently, we find the following statements in R. v. Mills:  
“Thus courts must presume that Parliament intended to enact 
constitutional legislation and strive, where possible, to give effect to this 
intention,”71 and, in M. v. H.: “Courts are simply ill-suited to manage 
holistic policy reform.”72 
While the Supreme Court was reluctant to resort to the legislative 
record to determine legislative intent in an early Charter case,
73
 
statements in recent years
74
 suggest more openness to examining not 
only the legislative record but also extrinsic materials of other kinds that 
would give evidence of the mischief that the legislation sought to cure. 
Some have suggested that there is a dialogue taking place between the 
courts and Parliament that allows each to have input on particular policy 
issues as they work towards the best solution.
75
 The Supreme Court 
________________________________________________________________ 
69
 For a discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Greene, The Charter of 
Rights (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1989), at 62-69 and 222. 
70
 Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, at 
605-06. See also Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, supra, 
note 63, at 194; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, at 575-76. 
71
 R. v. Mills, [1999] 3. S.C.R. 668, at 711. 
72
 M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at 170-72, per Bastarache J. 
73
 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486. 
74
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, at 483-84; RJR-
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at 
242-43 and 333. 
75
 Hogg and Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” 
(1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; Ryder, “The Supreme Court’s Role: 
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itself has expressly accepted this characterization in at least two recent 
cases and goes on to suggest, in both those cases, that such a dialogue 
enhances the democratic process.
76
 Others claim that this dialogue 
theory has been overstated; that the dialogue goes in one direction only 
and that the courts have effectively been issuing orders that Parliament 
must obey.
77
 Christopher Manfredi asserts what he calls the “paradox” 
whereby, in Canada, as in other countries, judicial supremacy is 
overtaking constitutional supremacy and thereby diminishing our 
capacity to govern ourselves through our conventional political 
process.
78
 It is not clear, in any event, that Parliament and the other 
legislatures are yet taking full advantage of the dialogue that the 
Supreme Court believes exists. 
Indications from the Supreme Court that it will sometimes defer to the 
legislatures, that it is open to seeking extrinsic evidence of legislative 
intent and that it is thinking in terms of a dialogue with the legislatures 
would all suggest the wisdom of governments, through Parliament and 
the other legislatures, making very transparent the policy considerations 
that underlie the decisions and approaches taken in legislation, as well 
as the evidence that support these decisions. Governments would be 
wise to pay particular attention to contextual arguments based on 
balancing other societal interests that they might make under section 1 
of the Charter or under the rights section itself. It is likely that courts 
will be much more receptive to arguments along those lines than to 
arguments that are directed only at limiting the scope of entrenched 
rights. 
Although these theories have been developed in Charter cases, they 
evidence a way of thinking on the part of the Court that could probably 
apply, at least to some extent, in relation to cases involving Aboriginal 
and treaty rights. Therefore, governments would also be wise to pay 
particular attention to arguments based on justifications for limitations 
on the rights under section 35 rather than relying primarily on 
arguments relating to the scope or existence of the rights. In relation to 
                                                                                                                                
Too Much Power?” (2000 Constitutional Cases, Professional 
Development Program, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 6 
April 2001), Tab 12. 
76
 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at 566 and R. v. Mills, 
supra, note 71, at 711. 
77
 See, for example, Morton and Knopff, The Charter Revolution 
and the Court Party (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000). 
78
 Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the 
Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
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section 35 rights, the courts have put an added emphasis on negotiation 
so this would be an important factor in determining whether limitations 
on these rights are justified. 
Before leaving this section there is another aspect of the relationship 
between the legislatures and the courts that should be mentioned. 
Sometimes it appears that courts are filling in on policy decisions where 
governments have failed to do so,
79
 or have failed to do so with enough 
speed. We have already noted that, even before 1982, courts have from 
time to time taken a leap in the law that has no precedential or 
legislative basis. Now that we have entered a rights age when a 
balancing of competing values has become the norm, occasions for the 
courts to take such leaps have become more numerous. 
In the area of Aboriginal and treaty rights, where nothing but the 
barest affirmation was included in section 35, there was enormous scope 
for the courts to take charge and move the agenda along. It is well 
recognized that Aboriginal communities are often among the most 
vulnerable in Canadian society, living sometimes in shocking 
circumstances of poverty and despair. Since both the courts and the 
legislatures have a role to play in seeing that the rights of the Aboriginal 
peoples are fully accommodated, if Parliament and the legislatures 
appear not to be moving as quickly as they should to advance the 
situation of Aboriginal peoples, it is natural that the courts will do so 
using their only tool at hand, namely a judicial pronouncement on 
rights. Decisions like Sparrow
80
 and Marshall
81
 were turning-point 
cases. New ways of interpreting Aboriginal rights were established that 
pushed governments to pay more attention to these rights. 
As with the Charter, it will be important for governments to find ways 
to make transparent the various considerations that go into the policy 
choices that it makes in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights so that 
the courts can be assured that the governments are doing what they can 
to accommodate rights and interests in a timely way. 
________________________________________________________________ 
79
 See, for example, Vriend v. Alberta, supra, note 76, at 575-76 
where a statement by the Government of Alberta was interpreted by 
Cory and Iacobucci, JJ. as a “deference” to the Court to decide whether 
sexual orientation should be added as a ground in Alberta’s human 
rights legislation. They say “The Government responded to this 
recommendation by deferring the decision to the judiciary.” 
80
 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
81
 R. v. Marshall No. 1, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456. 
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VI. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT 
The Government of Canada, and other governments in Canada, have 
multiple roles and responsibilities. The most fundamental duty of 
government is to promote the general public interest and to do the best it 
can for all Canadians. That includes the duty to make the best public 
policy decisions that it can and to spend wisely, and carefully, its 
taxpayers’ money. The government has the duty to uphold the rule of 
law, democratic principles and other values fundamental to Canadian 
society. 
At the same time, the Government of Canada, and other governments 
in Canada, have a duty to protect the interests that are identified in our 
Constitution as warranting special protections. These include the 
Charter rights and the Aboriginal and treaty rights already discussed. 
They also include a number of group rights that have developed in 
Canada’s own historical context. These are sometimes cast as individual 
rights but have the interest of a minority group at the core. There are 
protections afforded to Canada’s two official languages, French and 
English, as well as schooling rights granted to minority populations of 
those two linguistic groups. In several provinces, special religious 
schooling rights continue to exist. Finally, there are all the statutory 
obligations created by Parliament and the other legislatures, as well as 
contractual obligations undertaken by governments that must be met. 
Governments must take all these factors into account when they make 
social or economic policy decisions, when they decide how to spend 
money, when they decide whether to acceed to the requests or demands 
of a particular individual or group of citizens and when they decide how 
to respond to the threat of litigation. 
The world of governing has become very complex and the emergence 
of a rights culture is very much a part of this complexity. A positive 
aspect of the recognition of the importance of rights is that governments 
are paying much more attention to the impact of their decisions on 
existing rights. At the same time, however, there is concern that this 
attention to rights is carrying with it some costs. 
VII. CONCERNS RELATING TO THE PROCESS OF GOVERNING 
Politicians, policy-makers, government advisors and government 
watchers in general have voiced a variety of concerns about possible 
negative results flowing from the need to ensure that constitutionally 
entrenched rights are respected. Some of these concerns are explored in 
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this section. The extent to which they are grounded in experience cannot 
be determined in the abstract. However, as a first step it is important to 
attempt an articulation and understanding of the concerns that are 
expressed so that they can either be dealt with or laid aside. 
 
1.  A General Increase in Litigation — Mega-cases  
Against Governments 
There is a perception, particularly in government circles, that the increased 
emphasis on rights, resulting in part from the constitutionalization of certain 
rights has led to increased litigation in general and increased expectations of 
government responsibility in particular. Governments have been named as 
defendants in huge lawsuits, sometimes resulting from events long past. 
It is undoubtedly true that Canadians have become increasingly litigious 
against each other as individuals, against private organizations and against 
governments. This phenomenon is not unique to Canada and is one that has 
drawn considerable attention. The entrenchment of rights in the 
Constitution has likely enhanced the tendency to litigate, thereby 
augmenting the volume of litigation even beyond the additional litigation 
flowing from the newly recognized rights themselves. 
For some years, a reaction to this situation has been developing. 
People are trying to find ways to avoid resorting to the courts. The all-
or-nothing, winner-take-all approach to dispute resolution is questioned 
by citizens in relation to disputes amongst themselves. Governments are 
asking the same questions. 
Some very large claims have been made against governments in 
recent years. Many of these claims have nothing to do with Charter 
rights or Aboriginal and treaty rights. However, because these claims 
are arising at the same time as governments are coping with the large 
volume of claims based on entrenched rights, there is a tendency to 
confuse the two types of cases. It is very important to distinguish 
between them. There is nothing new in principle about claims arising 
from alleged wrongs inflicted by governments on groups or individuals. 
Similar actions could have been instituted long before 1982 under our 
general tort, contract or statutory law, depending on the circumstances 
of the case. 
One recent example of mega-litigation affecting the Government of 
Canada that does not arise, at least primarily, from constitutionally 
protected rights
82
 is the “hepatitis C” litigation, arising from difficulties 
________________________________________________________________ 
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 That is not to say that the entrenched rights may not be raised in 
relation to some aspect of these cases or, some time in the future, in 
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with the blood system. Another is the many individual lawsuits relating 
to the treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools. These 
lawsuits are directed against other parties as well as governments. In the 
case of the residential schools, governments were involved in 
establishing, monitoring or regulating them while churches operated the 
schools. The governments may be particularly vulnerable to such suits 
since citizens tend to look first to governments for assistance both 
because of their relationship to governments and because of the 
financial resources available to governments. 
One concern that is often expressed about some of the mega-litigation 
that the government is facing, is that too much emphasis is being put on 
sins of the past that cannot be changed, especially if recent governments 
had no involvement in those sins. General observations are made that 
litigation is not the best way to address past wrongs since it inhibits us as 
a society from moving ahead. On the other side, views are put forward 
that without some formal action, like litigation and compensation, deeply-
felt grievances will not be adequately addressed. There is a need for a 
tangible acknowledgment of past wrongs by governments and society at 
large that goes to the very core of the self-respect of the individuals or 
groups who were aggrieved, or who represent those who were aggrieved. 
These are important issues and they need to be explored, but it is 
important to understand that these cases do not flow directly from the 
entrenchment of Charter rights or of Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
Depending on policy choices by governments involved in some of this 
mega-litigation, there may be solutions available to governments to limit 
their liability that would not likely be available in litigation arising from 
the entrenched rights. For example, it might be possible to invoke 
existing statutory limitation clauses in certain cases. Alternatively, it 
might be possible to diminish or remove liability through new 
legislation. These approaches, particularly the latter, might themselves be 
susceptible to legal challenge, including Charter challenge, but they are 
avenues that could be explored in ordinary litigation. Of course, such 
approaches may be politically quite unpalatable. What is important is that, 
in making decisions on what options to explore, governments clearly 
understand whether they are making their decisions on legal grounds or 
on policy or political grounds. 
                                                                                                                                
relation to the way these claims are ultimately resolved. But the point 
here is that the source of these claims is the ordinary law, not the 
entrenched rights. 
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It is important to dispel perceptions that put more problems at the feet 
of entrenched rights than rightfully belong there. The way is now open 
to move on to those concerns that do relate to entrenched rights as such. 
2. A Loss of Control 
The issue of the power shift from governments and legislatures to the 
courts was discussed at some length in the section on the role of the 
courts. That is one way — how issues are resolved — in which control 
can be seen to be lost by governments as a result of rights litigation. 
There are others. Another concern frequently expressed is the loss of 
control by the government of its own agenda. Rights cases frequently 
receive a great deal of media attention necessitating, in turn, the direct 
attention of politicians and government officials. 
Perhaps the most disquieting aspect of rights claims for governments is 
the randomness with which many of these claims seem to come up, 
particularly those under the Charter. There are, of course, many situations 
where cases can be foreseen (for example in rapidly developing areas such 
as equality claims relating to sexual orientation) but the Charter allows for 
many unexpected claims as well. 
Another concern is that governments are losing control because of the 
sheer volume of these rights cases. This is particularly true of the cases 
relating to Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
There is no magic solution to any of these concerns. Governments 
cannot simply resign themselves to this loss of control, but must 
continue to seek ways to manage the unpredictability and volume of 
these cases. One approach would be to increase communication between 
governments and rights holders so as to broaden their input into 
government decisions at an earlier stage. This might succeed, in some 
cases, in moving the focus of the relationship between governments and 
rights holders towards negotiation and solutions rather than to the 
adversarial approach of litigation. 
3. A Dampening Effect on Policy Decisions 
A frequently heard suggestion is that the very existence of the Charter 
and section 35 is inhibiting good policy initiatives. If this is the case, the 
social costs, while not susceptible to precise measurement, could be 
significant. The claim is that there have been policy initiatives that should 
have gone ahead, but have not gone ahead for fear of complex litigation to 
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follow, or, alternatively, that the initiatives that have succeeded in going 
ahead, have been so watered down as to significantly reduce their efficacy. 
On one level this concern amounts to an inquiry into the ability of the 
government to make effective policy decisions. This would include the 
question of whether it is weighing its legal risks effectively. At the same 
time, it may be that the most important result of the second thought 
given to policy initiatives is an overall improvement in the quality of 
those initiatives that do go forward. 
In order to assess the dampening effect properly it would be necessary 
to track the progress of actual policy initiatives to determine to what 
extent the existence of entrenched rights do in fact inhibit policy 
initiatives. It is certainly true that initiatives are subjected to 
constitutional scrutiny in the normal course within government. To 
balance this concern it would be necessary to track, as well, how many 
policy initiatives that did not go ahead as originally proposed were 
appropriately prevented from doing so. It would be important to 
identify, in either case, the reasons why policy initiatives that did not go 
ahead could not be adjusted to meet constitutional requirements; 
whether, for example, the problem related to political concerns, costs, 
administrative burden or something else.  
An initiative might be withdrawn because it is underinclusive. A 
rights assessment might lead to the conclusion that the program under 
consideration had to be broadened beyond the class of citizens originally 
contemplated in order to provide benefits to a broader range of 
individuals. In the context of available funding, the benefits might then 
be so thinly spread that the program would cease to be effective. It 
would be informative to determine whether such a situation has ever 
actually arisen. If it has, it would be instructive to consider why the 
government wished to grant benefits to the narrower group and the 
government’s rationale for drawing the line where it did. We have seen, 
earlier in this paper, that the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, are 
asking similar questions. Governments would be well advised to ensure 
that they have good answers for these questions when they develop any 
new benefits programs. 
Another way an initiative could be withdrawn might be as a result of 
an intense political lobby. It may happen that pressure groups couch 
their objections in terms of rights even if rights are not the real issue. It 
would be useful to determine if this type of situation has occurred often, 
if at all. 
To put into perspective the general concern that rights have a 
dampening effect on policy initiatives, perhaps it is worth observing that 
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many policy initiatives of governments may move ahead with minimal 
interface with entrenched rights. One could mention, for example, 
balancing the budget, international trade issues, health care issues, energy 
issues, environmental issues and federal-provincial relations. All of these 
will touch rights issues from time to time, but rights issues would likely 
not predominate. Therefore, it would be instructive to gather data on the 
proportion of policy initiatives that actually do engage rights issues to a 
significant degree. 
4. Concerns About Other Legitimate Interests 
Fairly closely related to the concern about a dampening effect is the 
concern that a focus on rights is interfering with the consideration of other 
interests that do not have the status of rights. There are a number of 
different facets to this concern. 
From one point of view this may amount to a suggestion that some of 
the rights that have constitutional protection do not merit inclusion. 
There is not much to be done about this aspect of the concern short of a 
constitutional amendment (involving political actors across the country) 
or resort to the “notwithstanding clause” in section 33, if available. 
Resort to section 33 would seem, in most instances, to be inappropriate 
to cover a situation of such generality. 
Conversely, this concern may amount to a suggestion that certain 
other interests ought to be protected at the level of rights. Again, there is 
no immediate action that can be taken to remedy that situation short of a 
constitutional amendment to include the interest in question. It should 
be noted, though, that the balancing that takes place under section 1 and 
other sections of the Charter already provides a mechanism to have 
these other interests taken into account. 
Sometimes this concern takes the form of a complaint that rights have 
coloured the way governments are seeing the world in such a way as to 
lead them to less than optimal policies and actions. It may evidence a 
deeper feeling that there is something wrong with a social structure that 
requires that everything be seen through a “rights” lens. It may also 
simply be a cry of frustration resulting from having to take rights 
seriously. The last suggestion may be closest to the truth, because it is 
difficult to find a basis on which to agree that the government is looking 
through a distorted lens when it takes rights into account in its decision-
making. 
Taking a somewhat different approach, sometimes the question arises 
as to whether there are any situations where a government action that 
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does not fully accommodate protected rights could ever be justified as 
being itself beneficial. In other words, can “good works” ever amount to 
a legitimate trade-off against existing rights? As has already been 
observed, governments do have access to balancing tests under section 1 
and certain other sections of the Charter and can balance competing 
interests in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights provided they can 
meet the justificatory tests articulated by the courts. 
It would be informative to inquire into what sorts of things would 
qualify as “good works.” They would likely have to be directed at some 
disadvantaged group. Perhaps alleviation of poverty in some direct way 
would qualify in certain circumstances. It may be that some rights are 
more susceptible than others to this type of an analysis. It is not easy to 
imagine a situation where section 15 of the Charter (equality rights) might 
be diminished by some other interest, since the essence of that right is to 
treat all individuals as equally deserving of the government’s care and 
concern. 
Some ask whether deserving groups or individuals whose interests are 
not protected will simply get lost in the shuffle. One response is that the 
existence of rights for some is not likely to prevent assistance for others. 
Charter rights, in particular, are set out as protections, not requirements. 
Furthermore, subsection 15(2)
83
 of the Charter (affirmative action) 
would seem to provide some legal basis, either through that subsection 
itself or through its effect on subsection 15(1),
84
 to assist some of these 
forgotten groups so long as the assistance within those groups is not 
given in a discriminatory way. 
In order to assess the concern about groups or individuals being 
overlooked, it would be necessary, if the concern is just a general one, to 
give serious thought to who it is that might be forgotten. If we cannot 
find an answer to that question, the concern has no practical effect. If we 
can, then we may have something to work on, either by broadening the 
scope of our initiative or by addressing the new problem in whatever 
________________________________________________________________ 
83 Subsection 15(2) reads as follows:  
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or 
activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of 
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
84
 See Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at 1003-11, 
where it is suggested that at our current stage of jurisprudence, 
subsection 15(2) should likely be handled through subsection 15(1). 
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way is appropriate. It would be necessary to have an appreciation of the 
specific case to find the appropriate approach. 
Suggestions have been made that the expenditure of resources to 
accommodate rights or to compensate those whose rights have been 
infringed will take away our financial capacity to deal with more 
pressing social problems (or otherwise divert us from these problems). 
One wonders first whether there are more pressing social problems than 
those that relate to needs that have already been recognized to be 
deserving of constitutional protection. One also wonders how real these 
suggestions might be on a practical level in any event. Would one not 
more likely expect to find a positive correlation between the 
constitutional recognition of individual and minority rights in a 
particular country and a progressive record of social policy advances in 
that country?  Most Canadians would agree to, and take pride in, the fact 
that ours is a progressive record. 
There are no absolute answers to the questions raised in this section, 
but they are important, and it is important to ask them and to probe the 
concerns that underlie them. Equally important is the recognition that 
the rights entrenched in our Constitution are here to stay and 
governments must respect them, even as they seek to ensure that other 
interests are taken into account and that the public interest is met. 
VIII. THE IMPACT OF RIGHTS ON SOCIETY 
The previous section dealt with the impact of rights on the act of 
governing. Broader concerns are raised outside government as to the 
impact of rights on society itself. This section will look at some of them 
and will conclude by referring to recent literature on the subject in fields 
other than law. To put the concerns into perspective, however, some 
general observations must first be made on the advantages to society of 
the constitutional recognition of rights. 
Most people would agree that it is a good thing for a society to have 
an articulated set of values. Most would agree, as well, that it is 
important to provide special protections for those members of society 
who are, for one reason or another, in a weakened position. The 
recognition and protection of rights serve a number of different 
purposes. The most commonly recognized purposes are to protect 
individuals from the unchecked power of the state and to protect 
minorities from the domination or disregard of majorities. 
There are more subtle advantages to the protection of rights. The 
recognition of individual rights in the fundamental law of a country 
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formalizes the democratic principle of the worth of each individual and 
articulates certain core values of that country. 
With respect to group rights, the mere fact that a minority group is 
mentioned as deserving of protection can add to the sense of self-worth 
of that group and encourage, among the members of the group, a sense 
of belonging both within the group and within the broader society. 
Beyond the obvious advantage of having the rights themselves, the very 
recognition of the rights can provide motivation to a disadvantaged 
group to improve the circumstances of their lives generally. The 
recognition of their rights can also add to the sense of commitment on 
the part of minorities to society at large. This can only be beneficial to 
everyone. 
Recognition of individual or group rights gives the rights-holders a 
voice that they may not have had before. It legitimizes their concerns. 
Without these rights there may be no way for them to get the attention 
of governments that they require. 
It has been mentioned already that Canadians are very proud of the 
rights that are protected in our Constitution. The Charter, conceived as a 
unifying force, has probably gone some way in achieving that goal. At 
the same time, not all reactions to our rights are positive. 
Concerns that are raised by citizens are usually not fundamental. They 
relate more to the way our rights are being interpreted than to the 
existence of the rights themselves. Some worry, for example, that the 
wrong balance has been struck, in the protections afforded an accused 
under the Charter, between those accused of crimes and victims of 
crime. 
At a broader level, it has been suggested that powerful groups in 
society, such as corporations or wealthy litigants, are in a better position 
to be able to assert their claims than those who are truly in need, 
sometimes even to the detriment of the interests of the disadvantaged. 
Related to this is the suggestion that the weaker groups in society must 
turn their cases over to lawyers and the legal system, thereby losing a 
direct relationship with their own issues as these issues are being 
resolved. The point of these concerns is the suggestion that, without a 
general restructuring of our society, the full effect of the entrenched 
rights can never be achieved. 
Sometimes fears are expressed that rights, by being written down, lie 
open to being diminished by an attitude of strict adherence to the letter 
of the law rather than being given a generous interpretation. Governments 
might be tempted to see these rights as ceilings, not floors. In a similar vein, 
one might argue that once rights are recognized and entrenched, they may 
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be taken for granted in such a way as to close off creative thinking around 
the issues that lie under the rights. 
Sometimes the suggestion is made that, even within a rights-holding 
group, whether that group is a minority within the scope of section 15 or 
an Aboriginal group protected under section 35, there may be 
disadvantaged sub-groups within those groups whose interests are 
dismissed or ignored. In this scenario, the minority would become a 
majority in relation to the sub-group. The fear is that such a situation 
would be harder to expose and rectify than that of a primary minority. 
None of these concerns should be ignored. They reflect an honest 
desire to ensure that rights are fully respected in individual cases. 
Concerns are also being expressed on a broader level. These relate to the 
effect that the existence of rights may be having on the way that citizens 
relate to their society as a whole. 
Some say that too much attention is given to “rights talk” and not 
enough to broader issues of concern to society at large. Joel Bakan, in 
his book Just Words,
85
 captures this concern even in the title, with its 
play on words. He suggests that to focus on rights is to miss the big 
picture. One might miss the underlying problems or issues if one looks 
only as far as the rights. Rights are just a very small piece of the puzzle 
that is society. Bakan sums up his thoughts in the following way: 
 
The struggle for social justice is much larger than constitutional 
rights; it is waged through political parties and movements, 
demonstrations, protests, boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience, 
grassroots activism, and critical commentary and art.
86
 
 
What this author underplays, it would appear, is the fact that the Charter 
has moved our social agenda forward. It has had a significant impact on 
protecting rights, particularly those of minorities and those included in 
section 15. A similar comment can be made in relation to section 35, 
Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
In a related vein, there are those who would suggest that a focus on 
rights, as well as diverting our attention, actually interferes with a true 
attempt to solve societal problems. Allan Hutchinson argues, in his book 
Waiting for Coraf,
87
 that to focus on rights is to divert us from the more 
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85
 Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
86
 Id., at 152. 
87
 Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). 
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fundamental need to talk to each other, to engage in a “democratic 
conversation.” He says: 
 
Rather than settle for the attenuated discourse of rights-talk, people 
must aspire to a truly democratic polity that will enable and oblige 
them to become full and contributing citizens in an expansive civic 
dialogue over the terms and conditions of social life and personal 
living.
88
 
 
Bakan suggests that Hutchinson does not pay enough attention to the 
fact that social forces colour “democratic dialogue” just as the “rights 
discourse” is constrained by the system within which it operates. 
The need to see ourselves as interconnected with other citizens is a 
theme that comes up frequently in relation to concerns about an undue 
emphasis on rights. One often hears the comment that to focus on our 
own rights is to lead us to neglect our responsibilities to others. Some of 
the ways this general thought is expressed are discussed below. 
In an unlikely article on postmodernism,
89
 reviewing a work by 
Michael J. Trebilcock on economic theory, Allan Hutchinson expresses 
these concerns in an interesting way. In propounding his own views on 
rights and citizenship, he stresses the organic nature of society and 
pleads that citizens should not see others as threats to their own freedom 
and fulfilment. He points out that the fate of all of us is interconnected 
and that a focus on rights creates barriers that separate people. He 
proposes that instead of the “me/they” dichotomy that flows from a 
focus on rights, we move to a “me/we” approach. Context, he says in 
true postmodern form, is always important. There can be no absolute 
rules. 
Michael Ignatieff, in The Rights Revolution,
90
 speaks about our 
general approach to, and relationship with, society. He explores the 
importance of reconciling different claims and recognizing the validity 
of opposing claims. He underlines the need to find a way to enhance our 
solidarity as a country in the midst of all the competing claims. We need 
to feel a connection to others from other groups in our society and to 
feel that their wins are our wins. 
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Alan Cairns, in Citizens Plus,
91
 picks up a similar theme in relation to 
Aboriginal peoples. He argues that our dialogue has gone too far in 
recognizing the separateness of Aboriginal groups and stresses the 
importance of seeing Aboriginal peoples as Canadian citizens as well as 
Aboriginal persons. It is important, he states, to address the issue of how 
the overall Canadian community will co-exist with Aboriginal self-
government. It is important to understand what holds us together and 
what obligations we have to each other. 
Attempts have been made to develop theories that can accept the 
legitimacy of constitutionally protected rights while at the same time 
recognizing the need to take other competing interests into account. One 
such attempt was made in a book called Rights and Responsibilities
92
 by 
Leon Trakman and Sean Gatien. Their approach was to develop a theory 
of “internal constraints,” which they characterized as “responsibilities,” 
that limit and define the content of rights. These “internal constraints” 
would apply in addition to any “external constraints” established by law 
and would be determined in the first instance by the rights-holder. Very 
important to their theory was their belief that the state is not able to 
determine what is necessary to protect social interests.  
Therefore, in the final analysis, it would appear that the content of the 
“internal constraints” would have to be determined by the courts, but 
without state intervention. How or why the courts would take 
jurisdiction is not explored. 
Another Canadian author who appears to be thinking along similar 
lines is Mark Kingwell. In his book, The World We Want: Virtue, Vice 
and the Good Citizen,
93
 he explored the concept of friendship from 
Greek philosophy and focused on a new type of citizenship that carries 
with it a duty to participate in political dialogue with other citizens on 
the basis of mutual respect and compassion. He saw rights as valuable 
tools but believed that litigation undermines communities. He proposed 
an emotional citizenship, rather than an intellectual one, and believed 
that engaging in a process with other citizens would lead us to a better 
society. 
What appears to underlie both the theory of Trakman and Gatien and the 
philosophy of Mark Kingwell is, once again, a desire to move towards a 
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society where the individuals in it communicate with each other and 
accommodate each other’s rights and interests. Whether these proposals 
could actually be put in place is probably not of primary importance. These 
authors simply suggest a way of approaching conflicts to avoid some of the 
problems they see in a rights-oriented society. 
The issue of how to respect individual and group rights, while at the 
same time maintaining the commitment of all citizens to their larger 
community and to their country, is central to much of the discussion on 
the subject of rights. Although not articulated in quite the same way as 
are the concerns expressed by politicians and government officials, they 
form a backdrop against which those concerns can be understood in a 
more profound way. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the impact of the entrenchment in our 
Constitution of the Charter and of Aboriginal and treaty rights. It has 
sought to understand these new rights within the context of our legal 
system. Several of the cases that have had a significant impact on 
governments have been examined. 
The paper has examined the role of the courts and the role of 
governments. It has exposed a number of concerns about entrenched 
rights from a government perspective, and has tried to examine these 
concerns in a balanced way. The extent to which the concerns are real or 
perceived, serious or minor, cannot be determined entirely in the 
abstract, but will require a critical examination of the way decisions are 
actually taken in government. This paper has also tried to provide a 
broader context for those concerns by examining briefly some of the 
ideas that are being expressed more generally about the effect of rights 
on our society. It is hoped that this type of inquiry will enhance our 
understanding of the challenges that we face. 
There is little doubt that the process of governing has become more 
complex since the Constitution Act, 1982. However, most would argue 
that the entrenchment of new rights has had a net beneficial effect on 
our society. In any event, governments will continue to make policy 
decisions on behalf of citizens, and individuals and groups will continue 
to press for their rights. Courts will continue to adjudicate in this sphere. 
The more we can understand about the dynamics of these relationships, 
the better all sides will play their parts. 
It will be important for those involved in making policy decisions, 
who feel in any particular instance that they are being driven to a 
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solution that is less than optimal, to communicate the specific details of 
how they believe this to be the case. Only then can we determine 
whether policy choices are actually being distorted when rights are 
involved, and, if they are, what values are not being accommodated. 
Without an honest assessment of what is really at stake we will never be 
comfortable that the right choices are being made. 
We should face these tasks with a level of optimism. We are well 
placed, as Canadians, to delve into these issues. Fundamentally, we are 
proud of the fact that rights are protected in our Constitution. Therefore, 
we are unlikely to conclude that our concerns outweigh the value of 
having these rights. 
Canada is a leader in recognizing the need to accommodate group 
rights as well as individual rights. Canadians are widely sought by other 
countries as consultants on minority rights issues. One could mention, 
for example, Will Kymlicka,
94
 Charles Taylor
95
 and Michael Ignatieff.
96
 
We are used to these issues. We value the diversity in the multiple 
cultural heritages of our citizens. We have taken care to ensure that both 
official languages, French and English, are used and flourish and that 
the minority communities that speak those languages have the support 
they need. Our efforts have given us a wealth of experience in 
protecting minority group interests. We are working with the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada to find solutions to some of the problems in their 
communities as we struggle to understand fully the implications of the 
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the 
Constitution Act, 1982. 
Finally, rights are with us to stay and it is incumbent on us to improve 
our ways of dealing with them. A first step in that direction is to develop 
a deeper understanding of our concerns and the next step is to examine 
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these concerns on a practical level so that we can discard the false 
problems and deal with the real ones. 
For now, if this paper succeeds in articulating some of the concerns 
felt by those involved in making policy decisions in a rights culture, and 
in shedding some light on them, it will have achieved its purpose. 
